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Bernhard Kasberger
Bernhard Kasberger
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf
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On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction
M Janssen, B Kasberger
Theoretical Economics 14 (4), 1271-1308, 2019
162019
Robust bidding in first-price auctions: How to bid without knowing what others are doing
B Kasberger, KH Schlag
Available at SSRN 3044438, 2020
132020
Can auctions maximize welfare in markets after the auction
B Kasberger
Working paper, 2018
62018
Budget Constraints in Combinatorial Clock Auctions
M Janssen, V Karamychev, B Kasberger
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, 318-337, 2017
52017
When Can Auctions Maximize Post-Auction Welfare?
B Kasberger
Available at SSRN 3519866, 2020
32020
An equilibrium model of the first-price auction with strategic uncertainty: Theory and empirics
B Kasberger
arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.07517, 2022
22022
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
B Kasberger, A Teytelboym
arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.11783, 2022
12022
Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information
B Kasberger, K Woodward
arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.11320, 2021
2021
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Artikelen 1–8