| Dynamic communication with biased senders C Margaria, A Smolin Games and Economic Behavior 110, 330-339, 2018 | 35 | 2018 |
| Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game C Margaria Games and Economic Behavior 119, 234-250, 2020 | 17 | 2020 |
| Queueing to learn C Margaria Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, Boston University.[1242], 2019 | 11 | 2019 |
| Exit dilemma: the role of private learning on firm survival D Cetemen, C Margaria American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 16 (1), 110-154, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| Online Appendix to “Dynamic Signaling in Wald Options” D Cetemen, C Margaria | | 2024 |
| Dynamic Signaling in Wald Options D Cetemen, C Margaria | | 2024 |
| Dynamic Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence D Cetemen, C Margaria | | 2023 |
| A Signaling Approach to Reputation D Cetemen, C Margaria | | 2022 |
| Exit Dilemma D Cetemen, C Margaria Available at SSRN 3732674, 2020 | | 2020 |
