Wolfgang Leininger
Wolfgang Leininger
Unknown affiliation
No verified email
Cited by
Cited by
Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: the two-player case
E Amann, W Leininger
Games and economic behavior 14 (1), 1-18, 1996
More efficient rent-seeking—a Münchhausen solution
W Leininger
Efficient Rent-Seeking: Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire, 187-206, 1993
Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
W Leininger, PB Linhart, R Radner
Journal of Economic Theory 48 (1), 63-106, 1989
Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
J Franke, C Kanzow, W Leininger, A Schwartz
Economic Theory 52, 589-630, 2013
The existence of perfect equilibria in a model of growth with altruism between generations
W Leininger
The Review of Economic Studies 53 (3), 349-367, 1986
Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation
B Hehenkamp, W Leininger, A Possajennikov
European Journal of Political Economy 20 (4), 1045-1057, 2004
Dynamic rent-seeking games
W Leininger, CL Yang
Games and Economic Behavior 7 (3), 406-427, 1994
Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: the role of research budgets
W Leininger
Journal of Economic Theory 53 (1), 146-172, 1991
A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game
H Bester, A De Palma, W Leininger, J Thomas, EL Von Thadden
Games and Economic Behavior 12 (2), 165-186, 1996
On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
M Hellwig, W Leininger
Journal of Economic Theory 43 (1), 55-75, 1987
Escalation and cooperation in conflict situations: the dollar auction revisited
W Leininger
Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (2), 231-254, 1989
The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
KA Konrad, W Leininger
Review of Economic Design 11, 165-174, 2007
Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem
J Franke, C Kanzow, W Leininger, A Schwartz
Games and Economic Behavior 83, 116-126, 2014
On supergames and folk theorems: A conceptual discussion
W Güth, W Leininger, G Stephan
Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets, 56-70, 1991
On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests
W Leininger
Economics of Governance 4, 177-186, 2003
Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests
J Franke, W Leininger, C Wasser
European Economic Review 104, 22-37, 2018
The fatal vote: Berlin versus Bonn
W Leininger
Finanzarchiv 50 (1), 1-20, 1993
Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: an elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
M Hellwig, W Leininger, PJ Reny, AJ Robson
Journal of Economic Theory 52 (2), 406-422, 1990
A generalization of the Maximum theorem
W Leininger
Economics Letters 15 (3-4), 309-313, 1984
Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
E Amann, W Leininger
Journal of Economics 61 (3), 273-279, 1995
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20