| The limits of price discrimination D Bergemann, B Brooks, S Morris American Economic Review 105 (3), 921-957, 2015 | 539 | 2015 |
| First‐price auctions with general information structures: Implications for bidding and revenue D Bergemann, B Brooks, S Morris Econometrica 85 (1), 107-143, 2017 | 177 | 2017 |
| Optimal auction design with common values: An informationally robust approach B Brooks, S Du Econometrica 89 (3), 1313-1360, 2021 | 116 | 2021 |
| Informationally robust optimal auction design D Bergemann, BA Brooks, S Morris Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, 2016 | 56 | 2016 |
| Search, information, and prices D Bergemann, B Brooks, S Morris Journal of Political Economy 129 (8), 2275-2319, 2021 | 41 | 2021 |
| Revenue guarantee equivalence D Bergemann, B Brooks, S Morris American Economic Review 109 (5), 1911-1929, 2019 | 39 | 2019 |
| Cultural impediments to learning to cooperate: An experimental study of high-and low-caste men in rural India BA Brooks, K Hoff, P Pandey Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (45), 11385-11392, 2018 | 29 | 2018 |
| Information hierarchies B Brooks, A Frankel, E Kamenica Econometrica 90 (5), 2187-2214, 2022 | 25 | 2022 |
| Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction D Bergemann, BA Brooks, S Morris Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research …, 2013 | 22 | 2013 |
| Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model D Bergemann, B Brooks, S Morris Theoretical Economics 15 (4), 1399-1434, 2020 | 20 | 2020 |
| Counterfactuals with latent information D Bergemann, B Brooks, S Morris American Economic Review 112 (1), 343-368, 2022 | 17 | 2022 |
| Selling to intermediaries: Optimal auction design in a common value model D Bergemann, BA Brooks, S Morris Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, 2017 | 16 | 2017 |
| Maxmin auction design with known expected values B Brooks, S Du Tech. rep., The University of Chicago and University of California-San Diego …, 2021 | 14 | 2021 |
| A'Pencil Sharpening'Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring D Abreu, B Brooks, Y Sannikov SSRN, 2016 | 13 | 2016 |
| Algorithms for stochastic games with perfect monitoring D Abreu, B Brooks, Y Sannikov Econometrica 88 (4), 1661-1695, 2020 | 12 | 2020 |
| A Strong Minimax Theorem for Informationally-Robust Auction Design B Brooks, S Du Available at SSRN 3663721, 2020 | 10 | 2020 |
| Comparisons of signals B Brooks, A Frankel, E Kamenica American Economic Review 114 (9), 2981-3006, 2024 | 9 | 2024 |
| On the structure of informationally robust optimal mechanisms B Brooks, S Du Econometrica 92 (5), 1391-1438, 2024 | 8 | 2024 |
| Culture and the efficiency of coordination: Experiments with high-and low-caste men in rural India B Brooks, K Hoff, P Pandey University of Chicago, manuscript, 2015 | 7 | 2015 |
| A canonical game—75 years in the making—showing the equivalence of matrix games and linear programming B Brooks, PJ Reny Economic Theory Bulletin 11 (2), 171-180, 2023 | 6 | 2023 |
Dirk BergemannDouglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics, Yale UniversityVerified email at yale.edu
